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Abstract 
Are real-world objects represented as bound units? While a great deal of research has 
examined binding between the feature dimensions of simple shapes, little work has 
examined whether the featural properties of real-world objects are stored in a single 
unitary object representation. In a first experiment, we find that information about an 
object's color is forgotten more rapidly than the information about an object's state (e.g. 
open, closed), suggesting that observers do not forget objects as entirely bound units. In a 
second and third experiment, we examine whether state and exemplar information are 
forgotten separately or together. If these properties are forgotten separately, then the 
probability of getting one feature correct should be independent of whether the other 
feature was correct. We find that after a short delay, observers frequently remember both 
state and exemplar information about the same objects, but after a longer delay, memory 
for the two properties becomes independent. This indicates that information about object 
state and exemplar are forgotten separately over time. We thus conclude that real-world 
objects are not represented in a single unitary representation in visual memory.  
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When we perceive a visual scene, we experience an organized and coherent set of 
objects and surfaces, not the disjointed patches of color or light that fall on the retina. We 
also appear to remember coherent, meaningful units: Moments after perceiving an office 
scene, for example, we might remember seeing objects such as a chair, a cup, and a 
person. In our subjective experience, it may seem that we perceive and remember each 
object as a coherent and integrated unit. However, a central question at the core of object 
representation is whether an object is actually represented as completely bound unit, or 
whether it is represented with separable properties or dimensions. 
Research on visual working memory has often claimed that the units of memory 
representation are bound objects (e.g., Cowan, 2001; Gajewski & Brockmole, 2006; Luck 
& Vogel, 1997; Vogel, Woodman & Luck, 2001).  For example, in their seminal study 
Luck and Vogel (1997) found that observers are equally good at remembering simple 
objects that vary along four features (color, size, orientation and shape) as objects that 
vary along only a single feature (color or orientation alone), suggesting that working 
memory capacity may be limited by the number of objects rather than the number of 
visual features that can be stored. This suggests that the units of memory are bound object 
representations. Since Luck and Vogel (1997), this strong object-based account of 
working memory representations has been shown to be too strong (e.g., Olson & Jiang, 
2002; Wheeler & Triesman, 2002), but a significant amount of data nevertheless 
demonstrates a benefit to encoding multiple features of the same object (Fougnie, 
Asplund & Marois, 2010; Luria & Vogel, 2011; Olson & Jiang, 2002; Xu, 2002), 
supporting the claim that visual working memory is at least partly object-limited rather 
than limited only by storage of independent visual features (for a review see Brady, BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     4 
 
Konkle & Alvarez, 2011). However, there is also strong evidence that memory 
representations are not truly stored as a bound unit, and different features can be 
represented independently over short delays (Fougnie & Alvarez, 2011; Stefurak & 
Boynton, 1986) or long-delays (Hanna & Remington, 1996).   
Most of the work on the boundedness of object representation has examined only 
very simple objects made up of geometric shapes and colors. Much less work has 
examined whether real-world objects are represented as bound units.  Since familiar real-
world objects are more natural stimuli for the visual system, they might have more bound 
representations than objects that are made up of entirely dissociable low-level features 
that seem to be stored independently even at the lowest levels of the visual system (e.g., 
orientation, color, spatial frequency: Magnussen, 2000) and which can be attended 
separately at encoding (Maunsell & Treue, 2006). Research on object recognition and 
long-term memory provide some proposals regarding the underlying representations of 
real-world objects (e.g., DiCarlo & Cox, 2007; Diana, Yonelinas & Ranganath, 2007; 
Hummel, 2000; Riesenhuber & Poggio, 2000). In particular, these models typically 
assume "bound" representations of real-world objects.  For example, view-based models 
of object representation tend to treat object representations as holistic, since storing a 
snapshot of an object from a particular view necessarily includes all the properties of that 
object in a single representation (Bulthoff & Edelman, 1992; Riesenhuber & Poggio, 
1999; Tarr & Bulthoff, 1995).  Further, most approaches to object recognition start from 
the assumption that object representations are independent of factors like lighting and 
size and rotation, but include all of the object’s parts and properties together as the end-
state of the ventral visual pathway (e.g., DiCarlo & Cox, 2007).  BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     5 
 
Similarly, long-term memory research typically makes a distinction between 
familiarity --a kind of holistic item memory-- and recollection, or memory for the 
episodic details and context of an item (Diana, Yonelinas & Ranganath, 2007; 
Ranganath, Yonelinas, Cohen, Dy, Tom, & D'Esposito, 2004). This distinction implicitly 
treats objects as unitary, where familiarity processes operate over object representations 
that do not require any binding, while recollection processes help retrieve information 
about how objects are bound to their contexts.   
Thus, much of the existing literature – from object recognition, long-term 
memory, and visual working memory – treats real-world objects as though they are 
represented as a single bound unit. However, existing research on object representation 
does not directly address whether features of real-world objects are stored independently 
or as a single bound unit; and research from simple objects points to the possibility of 
independent representations of separate properties (Fougnie & Alvarez, 2011; Hanna & 
Remington, 1996; Stefurak & Boynton, 1986).  
In the present study, we sought to empirically examine the assumption that 
different properties of a real-world object are represented as a single bound unit, as 
opposed to being represented as independent features.  Furthermore, we sought to do so 
in a way that controlled for effects at encoding and retrieval that can falsely make objects 
look independent or bound (e.g., attention to only one property at encoding; or being 
more attentive on some trials than others). We used the logic that, if a single bound 
representation of an object exists, then all of the object's features will be remembered or 
forgotten together. By contrast, if we observe that different properties are forgotten 
independently of each other, this would imply independent storage of the properties. BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     6 
 
While we do not know the underlying features of object representation, we can examine 
observers’ ability to remember different object properties, such as an object’s state, color, 
or exemplar (see Brady, Konkle, Alvarez & Oliva, 2008).  For example, observers can 
distinguish whether a door is open or closed (change of state), whether it is blue or red 
(change of color), or whether it is an ornate wooden door or a plain metal door (change of 
exemplar).  While these object properties are not likely to reflect primitive features for 
the visual system, they are semantically meaningful properties. We can thus use them to 
examine whether memory for different object properties may be supported in memory by 
different underlying features and thus whether different properties may be forgotten 
separately.   
In Experiment 1, we varied object color and object state properties, and examined 
whether observers forget one property more than the other over time.  If so, this result 
would suggest that objects are not represented as single bound units with an all-or-none 
representation of object color and object state.  In Experiment 2, we directly examined 
how memory for one property of an object (exemplar) was tied to memory for another 
property of an object (state) when observers were tested in a surprise memory task.   In 
both experiments, which vary in paradigm, analysis method, and conditions of intentional 
and unintentional memory encoding, we find evidence for independent forgetting of 
different object properties. In Experiment 3, we show that we can artificially induce 
apparently bound object representations by varying the strength of encoding for different 
objects, such that observers are likely to encode both properties of some objects and 
neither property of other objects. Together, these results demonstrate that real-world 
objects are not represented as a single bound unit in visual memory and that object BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     7 
 
representations can falsely appear bound after short delays because of encoding and 
retrieval factors. 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
In a first experiment, we examined whether an object's state and an object's color 
are represented in a single bound representation, or are represented as independent 
properties. To examine this, we looked at whether observers differentially forget these 
object properties over time.  We had observers study real-world objects and then we 
tested their memory for the color and state of each object after either a short delay or a 
long delay. We reasoned that different rates of forgetting for different object properties 
would suggest that the properties were stored independently. For example, if the ability to 
detect both kinds of changes was equal at short delay, but the ability to detect one kind of 
change decreased more than the other with increased delay, this would provide evidence 
that different object properties are forgotten separately. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
43 naïve observers were recruited from the MIT participant pool (age range 18-
35) and received 5 dollars for their participation. All gave informed consent. 21 of the 
observers participated in the short-delay condition and 22 of the observers participated in 
the long-delay condition. 
Stimuli 
Object images were chosen from a previously published set of stimuli (Brady, 
Konkle, Alvarez & Oliva, 2008), supplemented with additional images from a BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     8 
 
commercially available database (Hemera Photo-Objects, Vol. I & II) and internet 
searches using Google Image Search. Overall, 100 categorically-distinct objects were 
selected, and for each of these objects two state-change images (differing in pose or 
configuration of parts) were selected. These objects were chosen such that they consisted 
of largely a single color, and this color was not intrinsic to the meaning of the object 
(e.g., the object would be recognizable in any color; see Figure 1 for example stimuli). In 
addition, we collected 200 other categorically-distinct objects that differed from those in 
the main set, but which were also recognizable in any color. These served as filler stimuli 
that would not be tested.  
To create the final set of stimulus images, the hue of each object image was 
rotated to make it a random color. Hue is represented on a color wheel from 0-360 deg, 
so the rotation required choosing a random angle for a given image, and then adding that 
angle to the hue of each pixel for that image. Finally, for those images in the main set, we 
created two sets of images: one in the randomized color, and one in a color 180 degrees 
in hue space from that color.  Pilot testing showed that a rotation of 180 degrees in hue 
space led to an approximately equal degree of difficulty in the color forced-choice as in 
the exemplar forced-choice, and using such a large change in hue space also makes errors 
more likely to be due to cases of forgetting the object’s color rather than memory 
precision decreases (Awh, Barton & Vogel, 2007; Alvarez, Konkle, Brady, Gill & Oliva, 
2009).  This left us with a final set of 100 categories, each of which consisted of four 
images (two state-change images, each present in two different colors), and an additional 
set of 200 randomly colored filler objects. 
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Procedure 
  General procedure. Observers were told to remember each object they saw as 
well as possible. Before the experiment began they were given examples of the kind of 
forced-choice comparisons they would see, one example each of a state change and a 
color change. All observers sat approximately 60 cm from a 21" monitor.  Objects were 
always shown at 7.5° visual angle. The experiment took approximately 20 minutes to 
complete. 
  Short-delay condition.  Observers completed 100 trials each. Each trial started 
with a study display consisting of 3 objects arranged in a circle around a fixation cross. 
The objects were shown for 1.5s, followed by a fixation cross for 1s. Observers were then 
presented with a two-alternative forced-choice. Two images were presented on the left 
and right side of the screen (see Figure 1) and observers were told to indicate which was 
present on the study display. Observers pressed ‘Z’ if they had seen the left image, and 
‘M’ if they had seen the right image. Then, after a brief (2.5s) delay the next trial began 
automatically.  
The three items on the study display always contained two objects from the filler 
stimulus set and one object from the main stimulus set. The item on the subsequent test 
display was the one from the main stimulus set, presented in either two colors (color 
change condition) or two states (state change condition). The location (left/right) of the 
correct answer was counterbalanced across observers, as was whether a given object was 
tested with a state change or a color change, and which particular state and color image 
was the studied image and which was the foil image. 
Long-delay condition. The long-delay condition consisted of a study phase and a 
test phase. In the study phase, observers were shown 340 objects one at a time for 1s each BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     10 
 
at the center of the display. 100 of these objects were from the main stimulus set, 200 
were filler objects, and 40 were back-to-back repeats of the filler objects. All items in the 
study stream were presented in a random order, and the subset of filler objects (40 of 
200) that were repeated was randomized across observers. During the study phase, 
observers were told both to encode each object into memory and to press the space bar 
when an object repeated. This repeat-detection task served to ensure that observers were 
attending to each of the images.  
In the test phase, observers completed 100 two-alternative forced-choice memory 
tests. Each of the 100 objects observers had seen from the main stimulus set was tested in 
the same manner as in the short-delay condition, again counterbalanced such that all 
objects were tested equally often in both the state and color conditions across observers.  
 
Results 
Two participants were excluded from the long-delay condition for failing to 
perform the back-to-back repeat detection task satisfactorily (d' = 0.9 and 2.5; mean d' for 
remaining subjects was 4.2 with standard deviation 0.5).  One participant was excluded 
from the short-delay condition for failing to complete the task. Thus 20 participants from 
both the short- and long-delay conditions were entered into the final analyses. 
Overall performance at the two-alternative forced choice task in the short-delay 
condition was 78.8% for color and 76.7% for state. In the long-delay condition, average 
performance was 67.8% for color and 72.5% for state.  These results are plotted in Figure 
2. Thus, there was a greater decrement in performance for color than for state with 
increasing delay (4% versus 11%).  BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     11 
 
To examine the reliability of these effects, we ran a 2x2 mixed ANOVA with 
state/color test as the within-subject factor and short/long delay as the between-subject 
factor.  Participants had lower performance after a long-delay relative to a short-delay 
(main effect of delay: F(1,38)=7.74, p=0.008,  ƞ
2
p = 0.14). We found no main effect of 
test type (F(1,38)=0.87, p=0.35, ƞ
2
p = 0.02), suggesting neither state nor color tests were 
more difficult on average. However, we found a significant delay x test-type interaction 
(F(1,38)=5.52, p=0.02, ƞ
2
p = 0.13), indicating a greater decrease in memory for color 
properties than for state properties as more time elapsed between study and test. In other 
words, color information is forgotten more than state information with a delay.  
 
Discussion 
We presented observers with real-world objects and then tested their memory for 
the objects' colors and state after either a short-delay or a long-delay. We found that 
observers' ability to detect a color change decreased markedly over time, whereas their 
ability to detect a change in object state remained relatively stable. These results 
demonstrate that observers are not forgetting each object as a bound unit, but instead 
forget some properties more quickly than others. These findings suggest independent 
storage of different object properties in memory. 
By including a short-term memory condition in addition to a long-term memory 
condition, we show that observers do not generally encode one feature preferentially over 
another (c.f. Hanna & Remington, 1996) and that our test comparisons are equally 
difficult for observers in each dimension. Thus, we find that object color information is 
being lost from memory more quickly even though it is just as likely to be initially 
encoded and equally likely to be retrieved after a short delay.  BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     12 
 
An alternative interpretation of these results is that color information was never 
bound to object identity to begin with, even at a short delay. For example, in the short-
delay condition observers’ may have simply remembered the three colors that were 
present on the study display without binding them to the identity of the objects.  Such a 
lack of binding even in the short-delay condition could explain why color was lost more 
quickly than state information. Under this account, the different decay rates for color and 
state information occur because color was not bound to the object in the first place, 
whereas state information is more integrated with the object representation and is 
therefore retained longer. Importantly, this account is consistent with the main claim 
suggested here – namely that objects are not stored in memory with all their features 
integrated into a unitary representation. 
Our objects were purposefully chosen such that they did not have diagnostic 
colors – that is, color was not a cue to the identity of the object. Thus, maintaining the 
color of each object in memory was expected to be difficult, as it was an arbitrary 
property that had to be bound into the object representation (and color is known to benefit 
object recognition when it is diagnostic, but not when it is arbitrary: Naor-Raz, Tarr, & 
Kersten, 2003; Tanaka & Bunosky, 1993; Price & Humphreys, 1989). In the same way 
that objects that meaningfully connect to existing knowledge are easier to remember than 
objects that do not (e.g., Wiseman & Neiser, 1964; Konkle, Brady, Alvarez & Oliva, 
2010), meaningful features within an object may be easier to remember than arbitrary 
properties of objects. However, this manipulation does not necessitate our finding that 
different properties are forgotten at different rates. For example, we could have found 
that having to bind an arbitrary color into the object representation makes the entire BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     13 
 
bound representation more fragile or more likely to fall apart, resulting in a loss of 
performance in both the color and state comparisons. Alternatively, we could have found 
that it was difficult or impossible to match performance in the short-delay condition for 
the two dimensions. For example, observers may have had difficulty encoding arbitrary 
information like color into memory in the first place. Instead, we find that the color 
information is initially encoded well, but is then selectively forgotten while state 
information is preserved. This suggests that the actual underlying memory representation 
is not stored as a bound unit, even while controlling for independence resulting from 
encoding or retrieval factors.  
 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
In Experiment 1, we used the fact that different properties of an object are 
forgotten at different rates to infer that the two properties are stored independently. In 
Experiment 2, we sought to examine more directly whether two object properties are 
remembered in a single bound representation or stored separately. To do so, we directly 
tested whether both properties of an object are remembered and forgotten together in 
long-term memory, or whether they tend to be remembered and forgotten independently. 
For example, if observers remember seeing a glass of orange juice, do they systematically 
remember what kind of glass it was as well as how much juice was in it?  How often do 
they forget only the shape of the glass or only the amount of juice? To examine this, we 
used two properties that have been shown to be forgotten at approximately the same rate 
(object state and object exemplar: see Brady et al. 2008), and looked at the probability of BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     14 
 
remembering one property given an observer remembered the other property about the 
same object (the dependence between the two properties).  
In general, interpreting raw dependence scores (e.g., conditional probabilities) is 
complicated by a number of confounding factors, and is not a pure measure of how bound 
two properties are in the memory representation. For example, observers may be likely to 
either remember or forget both properties of an object because their overall attentiveness 
or fatigue level changed over the course of the experiment.  Since both properties of the 
same object necessarily occur at the same point in time (they are both a part of the same 
object), this can make object representations look more bound than they truly are. In 
addition, successfully remembering one property may help in the retrieval of the other 
even if they are stored independently (e.g., encoding specificity; Tulving & Thompson, 
1973), again introducing overestimates of boundedness.  
On the other hand, the degree of boundedness can also be underestimated if there 
are differences in the difficulty of the exemplar and state comparisons. For example, any 
random variability in the degree of precision required for the state and exemplar 
comparisons across objects  - causing state errors without exemplar errors for some 
objects, and vice versa for others - will masquerade as independent forgetting of features, 
underestimating the degree of boundedness in memory. 
To avoid confounds from such encoding, retrieval, and stimulus factors, the 
critical manipulation in this experiment is to examine how memory performance changes 
over time. This holds confounding factors constant, and also gives time for observers to 
forget some of the objects’ properties. If the object properties are stored and forgotten 
independently, over time observers should be more likely to remember only a single BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     15 
 
property.  In other words, the dependence between the object properties should decrease 
over time.  In contrast, if the object properties are stored and forgotten together, then over 
time memory for the two object properties should have the same level of dependence.  By 
taking into account how dependence changes with delay, we can observe not only how 
dependent the properties are on each other initially, but also whether the objects are 
forgotten in a bound or independent manner.  
Thus, we tested observers' long-term memory performance after a short-delay (30 
min) and their long-term memory performance after a long-delay (3 days) and examined 
whether the dependence between object properties decreased or stayed the same. Any 
decrease in dependence between the two object properties over time could not be caused 
by either encoding or retrieval factors, which were identical at the two delays. Thus, 
change in dependence over time allows us to infer whether two object properties are 
stored in a single unitary representation or stored independently. 
 
 
Methods 
Participants 
30 naïve observers were recruited from the MIT participant pool (age range 18-
35) and received 5 dollars for their participation. All participants gave informed consent. 
15 of the observers participated in the short-delay condition and 15 of the observers 
participated in the long-delay condition.  
 
Stimuli 
Object images were chosen from previously published sets of stimuli (Brady, 
Konkle, Alvarez & Oliva, 2008; Konkle, Brady, Alvarez & Oliva, 2010), supplemented BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     16 
 
with additional images from a commercially available database (Hemera Photo-Objects, 
Vol. I & II) and internet searches using Google Image Search. Overall, 120 basic-level 
categories of object were selected, and for each of these categories we selected two 
matching state images for each of two category exemplars. This yielded 120 object 
categories with 4 images each (2 exemplars x 2 states; see Figure 3).  
 
Procedure 
The experiment consisted of a study phase and a test phase. In the study phase, 
observers were shown 120 objects one at a time for 200ms each at the center of the 
display with a 1800ms ISI. During the presentation of the objects, they judged the 
physical size of the object (whether it was larger or smaller than a particular container 
they were shown, which was slightly smaller than a shoebox). 
Following this task, they were given a surprise long-term memory task, either 
immediately following the study period (short-delay) or after a 3-day delay (long-delay). 
In the long-delay condition, observers were told immediately after the study period they 
would need to return in 3 days to perform memory tests. We used a surprise memory test 
and a 3 day delay to ensure that observers’ performance was off ceiling at short delay and 
decreased substantially between the short and long delay, given that previous work has 
shown observers are quite good at these comparisons even after 5 hours of studying a 
large number of objects (Brady et al. 2008). To probe which properties of each object 
were encoded, a 4-alternative forced choice test display was presented for each object, 
consisting of two exemplars (one familiar, one novel), each in two states (one familiar, 
one novel).  Observers used the mouse to click on which of the 4 images they believed 
they had seen previously. After choosing an image, they separately reported how BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     17 
 
confident they felt (high or low) on both the state comparison and the exemplar 
comparison. The next trial then began automatically. There was no feedback. 
 
 
Data Analysis – Calculating the Dependence Score 
To address our main hypothesis, we examined the level of dependence between 
observers’ reports of the state and exemplar properties. To do so, we calculated how 
much more likely observers were to get one property correct (e.g., state) if they got the 
other property correct than if they got it incorrect, taking into account the contributions of 
random guessing.  In order to convert this into a dependence measure (% dependent), we 
first formalized two models: a fully-independent model in which the properties are stored 
and forgotten independently, and a fully-bound model in which the properties are always 
stored and forgotten together.  Then, we quantified where our observed data fell in 
between the predictions of the two models. Finally, for our critical comparison, we 
examined how this dependence score for the two properties changed between the short 
and long-delays.   
  In the fully-independent model (referred to as D=0 below), there is never any 
benefit for memory of the state property given that exemplar was remembered, because 
the two properties are independent. Thus, no matter what the overall percent correct is, 
for an independent model of these two properties, the added memory benefit to one of 
remembering the other is 0: 
 
0 ) | ( 0 =
+
= exemplar state pD
 
  In the fully-dependent model (referred to as D=1 below), if the exemplar 
information is remembered, then the state information will always be remembered.  If all BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     18 
 
the objects were remembered, then the increased memory performance for state 
information given exemplar information will go from chance (0.5) to remembered (1.0), 
for a maximal added benefit of 0.50.  However, if observers do not remember an object, 
we assume they guess randomly from amongst the 4 items on the test display, and thus 
this guessing is independent for the two properties.  As a consequence, even in the case of 
a fully-bound underlying representation, random guessing for forgotten items will bring 
the added benefit down from 0.50.  To account for this random guessing, we computed 
the guessing-adjusted fully-bound model, based conceptually on  that of Gajewski and 
Brockmole’s (2006) model of boundedness in short-term memory, as follows. 
  First we estimate the percent remembered (R) for each property, based on the 
overall percent correct: 
1 2 ) ( − = pc pc R    
This formula treats memory as high-threshold and takes into account that any overall 
percent correct (pc) was achieved not only because items were remembered, but also 
sometimes items were forgotten but guessed correctly (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005).  
The “adjusted percent remembered” R estimates how often observers truly remember a 
property, after accounting for fortunate guesses and is calculated based on overall 
performance and chance (here 50% for each property).   
  Then, for any a given percent correct, the expected p
+ (state|exemplar) according 
to the bound model can be calculated: any time observers remember the property (R% of 
the time), they should have complete dependence (p
+ (state|exemplar) =0.5), and anytime 
they forget a property (1-R% of the time), guessing should cause complete independence 
(p
+ (state|exemplar)=0).  Thus, while in theory a fully-bound representation would have a BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     19 
 
p
+ (state|exemplar) of 0.5, once we take into account guessing, the dependence expected 
in a fully bound model (referred to as D=1 below) varies as a function of overall percent 
correct (see Appendix A for derivation and simulation code): 
 
1 ) (
) (
) | ( 1 +
=
+
= pc R
pc R
exemplar state pD  
These expected dependences between properties in a fully-independent model and in a 
fully-bound model are plotted in Figure 4 as solid black lines.   
  Based on these models, for each observer we computed how dependent 
performance was between the state and exemplar conditions.  This number could be a 
value between 0 (fully independent) and 1 (fully-dependent), and was computed based on 
the percentage of the way between the independent and bound model predictions the 
observers’  ) | ( exemplar state p
+  was at the observed percent correct. Since the fully 
independent model always predicts  ) | ( 0 exemplar state pD
+
= = 0, this reduces to simply: 
) | (
) | (
1 exemplar state p
exemplar state p
D
D
+
=
+
=  
where D is the dependence score of the observer,  ) | ( exemplar state p
+ is how much more 
likely the observer was to get the state correct if they got the exemplar correct, and 
) | ( 1 exemplar state pD
+
= is the bound model prediction at the observers' percent correct. 
 
Results 
Two participants were excluded from the long-delay condition for failing to 
perform the size judgment cover task satisfactorily. Thus, 15 participants from the short-
delay and 13 from the long-delay condition were entered into the final analysis.  BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     20 
 
Overall performance at the task was estimated separately for exemplar and state 
comparisons (e.g., whether observers indicated the correct exemplar independent of what 
state they chose, and whether they indicated the correct state, independent of what 
exemplar they chose). In the short-delay condition performance was 78.7% for exemplar 
and 72.3% for state. In the long-delay condition, average performance was 66.6% for 
exemplar and 63.0% for state.  
To address our main hypothesis, we examined the level of dependence between 
the two properties. After a short delay, we found that observers showed 46.6% 
dependence of state on exemplar (S.E.M. 9.7%) and 27.4% dependence of exemplar on 
state (S.E.M. 4.9%), both significantly different from zero (t(14)=3.8, p=0.0003, Cohen’s 
d=1.2, and t(14)=5.6, p=0.00006, d=1.45, respectively). The asymmetry between 
state|exemplar and exemplar|state is a result of the slightly different overall performance 
in the two conditions. After a three-day delay, we found that observers showed 13.4% 
dependence of state on exemplar (S.E.M. 14.1%) and 7.6% dependence of exemplar on 
state (S.E.M. 8.7%), neither significantly different than zero (t(12)=0.97, p=0.36, d=0.27 
and t(12)=0.87, p=0.40, d=0.24, respectively). In addition, these values of dependence 
were lower than those observed in the short-delay condition (state given exemplar: 
t(26)=1.99, p=0.057, d=0.75, exemplar given state: t(26)=2.06, p=0.05, d=0.78). These 
results show that the features were remembered more independently over time. 
Importantly, by comparing dependence rather than raw conditional probabilities, we 
remove the main effect of observers' decreased performance at a longer delay and adjust 
for the fact that guessing is necessarily independent. 
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Confidence 
In addition to choosing which of the four stimuli observers believed they had 
seen, observers also gave us confidence judgments separately for the state and exemplar 
properties of the object. Thus, after observers chose their answer, we highlighted two of 
the objects (the one they chose and the change-of-state object) and they indicated how 
sure they were that the correct answer was the one they chose and not the other object 
(low or high confidence); then we did the same for the change-of-exemplar object. 
Overall, observers’ confidence was well calibrated: accuracy was higher when 
confidence was high (M=84% SEM=+/- 2.6% in the short-delay condition, and M=74% 
+/- 2.4% in the long-delay condition), than when confidence was low (61% +/- 1.7%, and 
58% +/-1.3 in the short- and long-delay conditions, respectively). 
Thus, we could also examine the degree of independence in memory 
representations by examining observers’ self-reported memory strength rather than their 
percent correct. In particular, if observers said they had high confidence in one 
comparison (e.g., state), how likely were they to also have high confidence in the other 
(e.g., exemplar)? This metric is informative because it helps confirm that changes in 
guessing are not the source of the increased independence after a delay. 
Subjects confidence decreased overall at long delay compared to short delay 
(chance of reporting high confidence: short delay, M=64.9%, SEM=4.6%; long delay, 
M=46%, SEM=4.2%). Importantly, this decrease appeared to be independent for state 
and exemplar properties. In particular, an observer's chance of reporting high confidence 
on one feature if they reported high confidence on the other feature was 82% (SEM = 
3.1%) after a short delay, and 62% (SEM = 3.9%) after a long delay. This decrease in BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     22 
 
dependence from short-delay to long-delay was significant (t(26)=4.04, p<0.001, 
d=1.53). However, an observer’s chance of reporting high confidence if they reported 
low confidence in the other feature did not differ across delay (short delay: M=38.9%, 
SEM=6.1%, long delay: M=31.9%, SEM=3.4%; difference not significant, t(26)=0.95, 
p=0.35, d=0.36). To compare how much more likely subjects were to report high 
confidence on one feature given they did so on the other, we computed an odds ratio. In 
the short-delay condition, the odds ratio was 10.9 (+/-1.1), reflecting observers’ having 
10 times the odds of reporting high confidence in one property if they had high 
confidence in the other; in the long-delay condition this odds ratio was only 4.1 (+/-1.1), 
a significant difference (p<0.01). This indicates that observers’ likelihood of having high 
confidence for both features decreased with delay, even after discounting the general 
tendency for observers to have lower confidence after a delay. 
Thus, these data show that observers’ confidence also grows more independent 
with time, in addition to their percent correct. As delay time increases, high confidence 
on one feature is less likely to co-occur with high confidence on the other feature. 
 
How independent are these features?  
The results indicate that state and exemplar information features are forgotten at 
least partially independent and that the underlying representation of these features is not 
fully bound. Can we quantify how independent the underlying memory representations 
for state and exemplar information must be from these data? 
After a short-delay, we find a 46% dependence of state on exemplar.  At one 
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are 46% overlapped; however, some percent of this dependence could also be attributed 
to “encoding correlation”, e.g. how likely observers are to encode or retrieve both 
properties of a given object due to other factors (like attention), even though the 
underlying memory representations are actually independent.  Thus there is a spectrum of 
possibilities for the true feature independence, shown in Figure 5 (red line), with 46% 
boundedness and 0% encoding correlation at one extreme, and 0% boundedness and 46% 
encoding correlation at the other (see formal model specification in Appendix B)  
In the long-delay conditions, we find a 14% dependence of state on exemplar 
memory. The same logic also allows us to break down the 14% boundedness observed 
into components that reflect both the true overlap in the features and the correlations due 
to encoding conditions, after taking into account the forgetting observed after the short 
delay. The full spectrum is shown in Figure 5 (blue line).   
Critically, we can find the combination of feature boundedness and encoding 
correlations that simultaneously fit both the short and long delay conditions.  The 
combined fit is shown in Figure 5 (black X).  The only model that fits both delay 
conditions requires nearly 100% independent forgetting of the features.  
The best fit parameters for explaining both the short delay and long-delay data 
suggest 97% independence between state and exemplar properties with r=0.63 correlation 
of the likelihood of initially encoding the two properties about the same object. In fact, 
when simulating what we would expect from complete independent forgetting (100% all 
of the initial dependence coming from encoding), we find that our dependence measure 
should go from 46% to 14% when percent correct drops from 72% to 63%.  This almost 
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provides strong evidence that the forgetting is almost totally independent, even though 
there is an initial dependence in how likely observers are to remember both the state and 
exemplar properties after a short-delay. 
 
Discussion 
In Experiment 2, observers were required to remember both the state and 
exemplar of an object, and we examined whether observers remember both properties 
together, or whether they forget the two properties separately. To examine this, we 
calculated the conditional probability of remembering one property given successful 
memory for the other, taking into account the independence of guessing. Interpreting a 
given level of dependence between the properties is difficult because this dependence can 
be influenced by a number of encoding and retrieval factors rather than simply the 
boundedness of the representation. Thus, we examined the change in this dependence 
over time, reasoning that any increase in independence of the two object properties with 
increased delay could not be caused by either encoding or retrieval factors, which were 
identical at the two delays, and must be caused by independent forgetting of the 
properties over time.  
We found that at short delays, there was significant dependence between the two 
properties – observers were more likely than chance to remember both the state and 
exemplar of a particular object (46% bound). However, at a long delay this dependence is 
markedly decreased (14% bound). This suggests that much of the initial dependence 
observed at short delays is due to encoding or retrieval factors, like the fact that all the 
features of a given object are presented at the same time and spatial location. However, BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     25 
 
ultimately the two properties of an object are forgotten separately. A straightforward 
model of how much of the dependence was caused by correlations at encoding vs. 
boundedness in the memory representation indicated that almost all of the dependence 
was due to correlations at encoding, since forgetting appeared to be completely 
independent. This suggests that the initial dependence we observe between the two 
properties may be solely due to encoding and retrieval factors like differential attention 
on different trials. Thus, our data suggest almost totally independent storage of different 
object properties in memory. 
The model of memory used in the calculation of dependence is a high threshold 
model. We believe this is reasonable, even if it is not entirely uncontroversial (e.g., Parks 
& Yonelinas, 2007; Wixted, 2007). In particular, we are asking people to recollect 
specific details of the objects, and our forced-choice comparisons require observers to 
choose between objects that are quite different from each other. Such large differences 
between the correct item and foil item seem to result in all-or-nothing memory retrieval 
in other features, like color (Brady et al. submitted). However, our conclusions do not 
depend on the high threshold nature of the model. In particular, forced-choice tasks in 
general are less sensitive to the distinction between signal detection and high-threshold 
models because with little bias, there is little dependence on the particular shape of the 
response operating characteristic curve that distinguishes these models (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005). Furthermore, in Appendix C we show that even if the underlying 
memory signal is better characterized by signal detection, our high-threshold model 
nevertheless does a reasonable job of characterizing the dependence between the 
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detection model in examining the dependence between properties, which inherently 
depend not on the model of successful vs. unsuccessful memory performance (the 
distinction between signal detection and high threshold models) but on the dependence 
between performance with one stimulus and another. 
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
The data from Experiment 2 strongly suggest that the forgetting of separate 
features is independent, and that the initial dependence we observe between properties at 
short delays is driven by encoding factors which lead observers to encode both properties 
about some objects and neither property about others. We hypothesized that this 
correlation in initial encoding probability could result from attentional differences over 
the course of the experiment. Thus, observers may be likely to either encode or fail to 
encode both properties of an object because their overall attentiveness or fatigue level 
changes over the course of the experiment. Since both properties of the same object 
necessarily occur at the same point in time and space, this could make object 
representations appear more bound than they truly are, particularly at short delays. In 
Experiment 3, we sought to test this directly by artificially increasing the likelihood of 
such encoding disparities. Specifically, we varied the display time of the objects, where 
some objects were presented for a longer duration than other objects. We expected the 
degree of dependence to be the same for short-presentation and long-presentation items 
analyzed separately, but that combining the data across presentation durations would 
make object representations appear more dependent. Such a pattern would highlight the 
fact that variability in the quality with which different objects are encoded will artificially BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     27 
 
inflate the observed dependence between features - a limitation we addressed in 
Experiments 1 and 2 by measuring forgetting over time.  
Methods 
Participants 
11 naïve observers were recruited from the Harvard University participant pool 
(age range 18-35) and received 5 dollars for their participation. All participants gave 
informed consent. None of the participants had taken part in Experiment 2. 
 
Procedure 
The experiment was identical to the short-delay condition of Experiment 2, with 
one exception: For each observer, a random half of the objects were displayed for a short 
duration (150ms) and a random half of the objects were displayed for a long duration 
(500ms). All other methods were identical to Experiment 2. 
 
Results 
As in Experiment 2, overall performance at the task was quite good, with 
performance at 85.2% correct for exemplar and 76.1% for state. The dependence scores 
computed separately for the short-presentation and long-presentation conditions were not 
significantly different (state|exemplar: 34% vs. 45%, t(10)=0.62,  p=0.55, d=0.19; 
exemplar|state: 29% vs. 31%, t(10)=0.14, p=0.88, d=0.05), and on average were 
comparable to the short-delay condition of Experiment 2. However, when all the items 
were analyzed together, we found a 77.4% dependence of state on exemplar (S.E.M. 
8.5%) and 43.6% dependence of exemplar on state (S.E.M. 5.6%). These dependence BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     28 
 
levels were greater than the dependence scores observed in the short-encoding duration 
and long-encoding duration computed separately (state|exemplar: t(10)=4.3, p=0.002, 
d=1.29,  exemplar|state: t(10)=1.7, p=0.11, d=0.51), as well as those observed in 
Experiment 2 (46.6% and 27%, respectively): state|exemplar, t(24)=2.3, p=0.03, d=0.90; 
exemplar|state, t(24)=2.2, p=0.04, d=0.86. These results suggest that increasing the 
disparity in how well particular objects are encoded can artificially increase the estimated 
dependence between properties. 
 
Discussion 
In Experiment 3, we manipulated whether observers had more or less time to 
study an object, in order to simulate the effects of stronger or weaker encoding that might 
naturally happen when studying a stream of items presented for equal durations.  
Critically, we found that feature representations were equally dependent whether items 
were presented for a short or long duration, but that combining these trials together leads 
to an increased dependence estimate.   
These data suggests that factors like differential attention on different trials can 
cause dependence between properties. This highlights the fact that the observed 
dependence between two properties can be driven not only by the true underlying 
dependence, but also by encoding and retrieval factors like differential attention on 
different trials.  These results help put the results of Experiment 2 into context. In 
Experiment 2 we observed 46% dependence at the short delay, but only 14% dependence 
at the long delay.  We assume that the true underlying dependence of these two features 
does not change over time; thus these two properties are at most 14% bound, with 
simulations putting this number closer to 0% bound.  The results of Experiment 3 show BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     29 
 
how the 46% boundedness observed in short delay could be so high due solely to the 
contributions of encoding and retrieval factors. Together with Experiments 1 and 2, these 
results suggest almost totally independent storage of different object features in memory. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Across three experiments, we investigated whether different properties of real-
world objects are represented with a single unitary object representation or whether they 
are represented independently. In Experiment 1, we showed observers arbitrarily colored 
real-world objects in different states, and tested their memory for these properties 
immediately or after a delay.  We found that, over time, arbitrary color information about 
the object was forgotten much more rapidly than the more meaningful state information. 
For example, people remembered they saw an upright lawn chair (as opposed to a 
reclined lawn chair), but not whether it was yellow or blue.  This suggests that objects are 
not forgotten as bound units, but instead some object properties are forgotten more 
quickly than others. 
In Experiment 2, we showed observers a set of categorically-distinct objects that 
varied in two dimensions (object exemplar and state). We then probed observers' memory 
for state and exemplar information after either a short-delay or long-delay. After a short 
delay, observers frequently remember both properties about an object, but after a long 
delay memory for these properties was more independent. For example, after a short 
delay people were likely to remember that the cookie they saw was a chocolate chip 
cookie with a bite out of it; however, after more time, they were prone to confuse the 
cookie with an oatmeal-raisin cookie (exemplar information forgotten) but still remember BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     30 
 
that the cookie they saw had a bite out of it (state information remembered), or vice 
versa. This suggests that different object properties are forgotten independently over 
time, even within the same object. In fact, the forgetting we observed over time in 
Experiment 2 appeared to be almost entirely independent for the two properties.  
In Experiment 3, we asked whether the initial dependence we observe between 
the properties at short delays derives from encoding and retrieval factors like attentional 
differences over the course of the experiment. We increased the heterogeneity of the 
initial encoding of the objects by showing some for shorter durations and some for longer 
durations. We found that increasing encoding disparity among objects leads to an inflated 
estimate of dependence. 
Together, these data indicate that observers do not store a single unitary object 
representation in memory: instead, some object properties persist while other properties 
are forgotten, and observers tend to forget different properties independently of each 
other for individual objects.  Furthermore, while there is often a dependence between 
how likely observers are to remember different properties of the same object, we show 
that this is likely to be due to encoding factors rather than reflecting a bound underlying 
memory representation.  
Below we discuss how independent storage of different object properties can have 
important repercussions for theories that advocate binding in both visual working 
memory and in long-term memory, as well as for models of object recognition, all of 
which tend to assume unitary object representations. 
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Object representations are not unitary 
The existing literature on object binding in perception and visual working 
memory has tended to focus on perceptual binding, in particular, the binding of different 
low-level features such as orientation and color into coherent, bound objects. For 
example, feature integration theory proposes that we recognize low-level visual features 
like color and orientation in parallel across the visual field, but binding these features 
together into coherent objects requires attention (Treisman, 1998).  Given the role of 
attention in this perceptual binding, it may not be surprising that much of the literature on 
visual working memory finds that features seem to be bound into objects in memory 
(e.g., Luck & Vogel, 1997), since (i) attention tends to be directed to all of the features of 
a particular object once that object is attended (Scholl, 2001; O'Craven, Downing & 
Kanwisher, 1999), and (ii) those objects we attend are likely to be the ones we remember 
(e.g., Chun, 2011; Rensink, O'Regan & Clark, 1997).  Thus, attention may be one 
encoding factor that often makes object representations appear bound, particularly in 
perception or after a short-delay: if a particular object is attended, all of its features are 
attended, and those features will all be remembered well; by contrast, all the features of 
an unattended object will not be well remembered
1. This role of attention during 
encoding could make even representations that are inherently independent and separable 
appear to be bound, as we found in Experiment 3. In addition to attention, other encoding 
and retrieval factors, like the fact that successfully remembering one property may help in 
the retrieval of the other even if they are stored independently (e.g., encoding specificity; 
                                                 
1 For an analogous idea that encoding factors like attention may cause the same items to be remembered in 
both implicit and explicit memory, see Turk-Browne, Yi and Chun, 2006. BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     32 
 
Tulving & Thompson, 1973), are all likely to impact the degree to which two 
independent properties of an object look bound. 
Thus, we believe that existing evidence suggesting bound representations in 
visual working memory (e.g., Gajewski & Brockmole, 2006) may reflect, at least in part, 
shared encoding factors rather than truly unitary memory representations. In support of 
this idea, recent evidence suggests that observers may often remember one feature of an 
object but not another, even in simple stimuli like colored oriented lines (e.g., Bays, Wu 
& Husain, 2011; Fougnie & Alvarez, 2011; Stefurak & Boynton, 1986).  Further, 
remembering multiple features of the same object can come at a significant cost relative 
to remembering only a single feature (Fougnie, Asplund & Marois, 2010). 
In addition, it is possible to observe independence between features like color and 
orientation even in long-term memory. For example, observers can remember which 
shapes they saw without any impairment from a change in the color of the object between 
study and test (Hanna & Remington, 1996), suggesting independent representations of 
these features. However, because they used simple low-level features and told observers 
in advance what the memory tests would be like, Hanna and Remington (1996) may have 
caused observers to attend to only a single property of the visual objects during the study 
phase (e.g., using feature-based attention: Maunsell & Treue, 2006). Thus, their results 
could reflect encoding strategies rather than independence in the underlying memory 
representations.  Similarly, encoding the features independently could play a role in the 
independence observed in much of the existing work in visual working memory (e.g., 
Stefurak & Boynton, 1986). In the present experiments, we ensured that both properties BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     33 
 
were equally relevant to the observer, and still found independent forgetting of these 
properties. 
By examining binding with real-world objects we were able to examine memory 
not only in the short-term but also at longer intervals. This is challenging to do when 
using meaningless or simplified stimuli as in previous approaches. In addition, by not 
telling people in advance about the memory test (in Experiments 2 and 3) and using 
properties that are not low-level and thus cannot be attended too separately, we can avoid 
the potential for observers to selectively encode one property over another. Thus, we 
believe that the method used in the current experiments – examining dependence between 
features not only at a single delay interval but examining how it changes over time – may 
be critical to understanding whether seemingly bound representations are just a 
consequence of encoding and retrieval factors rather than reflecting the true underlying 
structure of memory.  By examining a change in dependence between properties over 
time, this approach allows us to examine the structure of memory representations while 
holding constant any dependence between properties induced by encoding and retrieval 
factors. 
Binding and perceptual integrality 
 
In the present experiments, we use object properties that are relatively high-level: 
object state, object exemplar and object color. This allows us to examine whether our 
memory representations for different properties are unitary, rather than whether our 
perception of two properties is unitary, as in the classic distinction between integral and 
separable dimensions (Garner, 1977). For example, using simple stimuli it can be shown 
that hue and shape are 'separable' dimensions, such that, for example, hue does not BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     34 
 
necessarily impact the perception of shape (Garner, 1977; Maddox, 1992). By contrast, 
hue and brightness are 'integral' dimensions, such that across a wide range of tasks hue is 
seen to automatically impact judgments of brightness and vice versa (Garner & Felfoldy, 
1970; Maddox, 1992). In the present experiments, rather than examining dimensions that 
are perceptually integral we examine properties that can be perceived separately and must 
be bound in memory. We can thus ask whether we form bound memory representation 
out of perceptually distinct features. This is a different approach than that taken in the 
existing literature on holistic representations of real-world objects; for example, some 
evidence suggests that faces are represented holistically as integral units rather than as 
bound but ultimately independent features of eyes, noses, and mouths (e.g.Tanaka & 
Farah, 1993; although see Reinitz, Morrissey & Demb, 1994 for evidence that holistic 
face encoding is may depend on attention at encoding).  
Binding objects to contexts  
Much of the literature examining binding with real-world objects has focused on 
binding objects to context. For example, in visual cognition it has been found that scene 
context can function as a retrieval cue for object details (Hollingworth, 2006); that 
memory for the spatial position of objects in scenes is better when the scene is presented 
during testing (Mandler & Johnson, 1976; Hollingworth, 2007); and that memory for 
object details and memory for the scene viewpoint are stored independently, rather than 
as a bound unit in memory (Varakin & Loschky, 2010). More broadly, long-term 
memory for individual items and objects is generally found to be independent of memory 
for the associations between items and the associations between items and contexts (e.g., 
Ceraso, Kourtzi & Ray, 1998; Mather, 2007; Marshuetz, 2005; Johnson & Raye, 2000). BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     35 
 
In fact, many models of memory suppose that the hippocampus and prefrontal cortex are 
critically involved only in the 'binding' aspects of memory important for remembering 
associations between various elements of an event, but are not involved in memory for 
individual objects (Davachi & Wagner, 2002; Mitchell, Johnson, Raye & D'Esposito, 
2000; Ranganath, Cohen, Dam & D'Esposito, 2004). These theories treat memory for 
objects as holistic, and memory for events as requiring binding between disparate 
elements to form a true episodic memory. 
In the current work we find that even memory for individual objects –often used 
as 'items' in such memory studies – are not holistic, and instead separate visual and 
semantic properties of objects are forgotten separately. This implies the recognition of a 
real-world object is not a holistic process, and instead requires association and binding 
between separate visual and semantic properties in order for an object to be entirely 
remembered. Depending on the stimuli used, many experiments that claim to be isolating 
a binding mechanism by contrasting memory for objects versus memory for the context 
in which such objects were seen may be failing to do so, as even their non-binding 
condition may depend critically on binding processes within objects (see Davachi, 2006 
for a discussion of within-versus between object binding and the role of hippocampus). 
While there are likely differences between within-object binding and across object-
binding (for example, emotion seems to differentially impact these processes: Mather, 
2007), the role of binding for features within real-world objects is critical to the 
interpretation of such memory studies. 
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Object representations and object recognition  
As both visual long-term memory and object recognition are thought to depend on 
the same high-level object representations (Palmeri & Tarr, 2008), memory errors like 
those in the current data may be able to usefully inform models of object recognition by 
elucidating the underlying object representation. In particular, one of the object properties 
we use in the current experiments is object state, which we define as a change in the pose 
or configuration of an object's parts (see Brady, Konkle, Alvarez & Oliva, 2008). This 
aspect of object representation has rarely been addressed in the existing literature on 
visual memory, and is likely to be an important component of object recognition: many 
everyday objects contain moveable units which affect the semantics or functional uses of 
an object while keeping visual information similar and not resulting in a change in 
identity of an object. Studying memory for changes in the configuration or pose of an 
object's parts is interesting because part-based representation is an important point of 
debate in the literature on object recognition and view-based vs. more structured 
representations of objects (e.g., Tarr & Palmeri, 2008).  
While our findings do not directly address whether separate parts within an object 
are forgotten separately, the independence of state changes from color or exemplar 
changes lends some credence to structural models of object representation where 
configurations of parts are explicitly represented independently of each other and could 
therefore be separately forgotten in memory (Hummel, 2000), as opposed to view-based 
theories which tend to assume holistic object representations (although see Ullman, 2007) 
and theories in which visual recognition is thought to proceed by increasingly complex 
conjunctions forming new features until an entire object is represented, which also tend to BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     37 
 
assume holistic object representations (DiCarlo & Cox, 2007; Serre, Wolfe, Bileschi, 
Riesenhuber & Poggio, 2007).  
 
Conclusion 
So what is the format of real-world object representations? We find independent 
forgetting of information about an object’s color, information that distinguishes different 
exemplars of the same category, and information that distinguishes changes in object 
state.  This suggests that the underlying visual features that we rely on to distinguish 
these different changes are distinct and are forgotten separately. These results 
demonstrate that real-world objects are not represented as a single bound unit in visual 
memory. Furthermore, while there is often a dependence between how likely observers 
are to remember different properties of the same object, this appears to be due to 
encoding factors rather than reflecting a bound underlying memory representation.  
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Figure 1. Methods of Experiment 1. (a) In the short-delay condition, observers were 
shown 3 objects at a time and then tested on a single one of these objects. Either the color 
or state of one of the objects was tested with a two-alternative forced choice, and which 
property of which object would be tested was not known in advance. (b) In the long-delay 
condition, all of the objects were shown, one at a time, and then observers were tested on 
one third of these objects. This test could be for either the color of the state of one of 
these studied objects. During the study period, observers also had to detect back-to-back 
repeats to ensure they were attending to the images.  The two-alternative test displays 
were the same in the short- and long-delay conditions.  
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Figure 2. Results of Experiment 1 (a) Percent correct at forced-choice comparisons for 
state and color in both the short and long delay groups. After only a short delay, the color 
tests are slightly easier than the state tests. After a long delay, observers perform 
considerably worse on the color tests than the state tests. (b) Decrement with delay for 
state and color. Observers' performance gets slightly worse for the state property with a 
delay, but considerably worse for the color property. BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     47 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Methods of Experiment 2. (a) Observers were presented with pictures of 
objects one a time. While viewing the objects, their task was to indicate for each object 
whether it was smaller or larger than a container they were given. They were not told 
there would be a memory test for the objects. (b) In the short-delay condition, after 
finishing the size judgments for each object observers were immediately told there would 
be a memory test and were tested on the objects they had seen after the study phase. In 
the long-delay condition, they were told there would be a memory test but they came 
back in 3 days to complete it. Each test trial consisted of a 4-alternative choice, with 
images of two different exemplars each in two different states. Observers’ task was to 
click on which of the 4 images they had previously seen.  BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     48 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Results of Experiment 2 for the state condition. (a) Given some level of 
performance in memory for the state of the object (x-axis), the y-axis, shows how much 
more likely you are to remember the state if you remember the exemplar of the object 
than if you do not. If the two properties are completely bound in memory, the expected 
conditional probability is represented by the solid black line. If the two properties are 
remembered completely independently the expected conditional probability would be 0 at 
every point on the x-axis. In the short delay, the performance on state tests given the 
exemplar memory indicated some dependence, shown in the dashed red line.  If memory 
for object state and exemplar information maintain this dependence relationship over a 
delay, then performance in the long-delay condition would fall somewhere on this red 
dashed line.  However, in the long-delay condition, there was a significantly lower 
dependence, plotted with the curve shown in dashed-blue. Note that this figure shows the 
model fit to the group data for illustrative purposes; for analysis purposes, the model was 
fit to each single subjects memory performance and statistics were performed over 
the parameter estimates. (b) Observers in the short-delay condition have more 
dependence between the two properties than observers in the long-delay condition, even 
after adjusting for the change in percent correct. BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     49 
 
 
Figure 5. Best fit models that vary in both the memory boundedness and the correlation 
between state and exemplar encoding. Both the short-delay (red line) and long-delay 
(blue line) conditions can be fit by assuming a correlation at encoding, a bounded 
memory representation, or any mixture of the two. However, the combined data can only 
be fit by assuming that nearly all of the forgetting is independent e.g., that the 
dependence results from correlations at encoding (black X).  
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Appendix A 
 
 
  Here we derive specific predictions for the dependence between state and 
exemplar accuracy given a fully bound model (dependence(D)=1), correcting for the fact 
that guessing is independent between features by definition. 
  If memory representations are bound, then the probability of getting the state 
correct given you get the exemplar correct will be depend on whether you remember the 
item or not. In general: 
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On the other hand,  observers’ should get the state comparison correct when they fail to 
get exemplar comparison correct only if they guess it correctly, since the bounded model 
posits the two memories are never recalled independently: 
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Correspondingly, p
+(state|exemplar), the amount more likely an observers is to get state 
correct if they get exemplar correct than if they get exemplar incorrect, is the subtraction 
of these two terms: BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     51 
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The following is Matlab code to simulate the bound model using Monte Carlo methods: 
 
nSubjects = 15; 
nItems = 120; 
  
percentCorrList = 0.5:0.01:1.0; 
for percI = 1:length(percentCorrList) 
  percentCorr = percentCorrList(percI); 
   
  % Do 500 simulations at each percent correct 
  for m=1:500 
     
    % What percentage of items should we remember? 
    R_mean =  2*percentCorr - 1; 
     
    % Generate simulated data with that number of items remembered 
    R = rand(nSubjects, nItems)<=R_mean; 
     
    % Generate independent guesses for state and exemplar 
    G_S = rand(nSubjects, nItems)<=0.50; 
    G_E = rand(nSubjects, nItems)<=0.50; 
     
    % We get a comparison correct if we remember it or guess correctly 
    stateCorrect = R | G_S; 
    exempCorrect = R | G_E; 
     
    % Save condition probability (increased likelihood of getting 
    % state given you also get exemplar): 
    condProb(m, percI) = mean(stateCorrect(exempCorrect==1))... 
      - mean(stateCorrect(exempCorrect==0)); 
  end 
end 
 
% Plot function 
plot(percentCorrList, mean(condProb)); 
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Appendix B 
 
 
To quantify the degree of independence between the underlying memory 
representations for state and exemplar information, we asked what percentage of the 
forgetting between our short- and long-delay conditions appears to be independent 
forgetting rather than correlated, bound forgetting. In particular, we model memory 
representations that (a) are truly independent and are thus forgotten independently, but 
are correlated at initial encoding; and (b) representations that are bound and thus always 
forgotten together. We then estimate what proportion of bound vs. independent 
representations is needed to best explain the data from both the short- and long-delay 
condition.  
Critically, we find the combination of feature boundedness and encoding 
correlations that simultaneously fit both the short and long delay conditions requires 
nearly 100% independent forgetting of the features (almost no truly bound 
representations). Pseudocode (in the style of Matlab code) for this simulation is presented 
below: 
 
% PARAMETERS: 
% ----------- 
percentCorrectAtShortDelay = 0.72; 
lossInPercentCorrectWithDelay = 0.09; 
  
initialCorrelation = 0.65; 
amountTrulyBound = 0.03; 
  
% SHORT DELAY: 
% ------------ 
  
% Sample initially correlated, yet ultimately independent state 
% and exemplar memories (of size [nSubs, nItems]) 
[Smem, Emem] = CreateCorrelatedUniforms(initialCorrelation, 
[nSubs,nItems]); 
  
S_mean =  2*percentCorrectAtShortDelay-1; BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     53 
 
S = Smem <= S_mean; 
  
E_mean =  2*percentCorrectAtShortDelay-1; 
E = Emem <= E_mean; 
  
% Simulate bound memories 
Rmem = rand(nSubs,nItems); 
R_mean =  2*percentCorrectAtShortDelay-1; 
R = Rmem <= R_mean; 
  
% Compute independent guesses for state and exemplar 
G_S = rand(nSubs,nItems)<=0.50; 
G_E = rand(nSubs,nItems)<=0.50; 
  
% Mix trials from bound and independent memories in appropriate ratio: 
useBoundForTrial = rand(nSubs,nItems) <= amountTrulyBound; 
  
% And calculate overall percent correct for state & exemplar: 
stateCorrect = (~useBoundForTrial & S) | (useBoundForTrial & R) | G_S; 
exempCorrect = (~useBoundForTrial & E) | (useBoundForTrial & R) | G_E; 
  
% Now calculate conditional probability for short delay: 
condProb_ShortDelay = mean(stateCorrect(exempCorrect==1)) ... 
  - mean(stateCorrect(exempCorrect==0)); 
  
 
% LONG DELAY: 
% ------------ 
  
% Now forget some memories -- forget independent memories 
independently: 
numItemsToForget = round(nItems*(lossInPercentCorrectWithDelay)); 
for j=1:size(S,1) 
  available = Shuffle(find(S(j,:)==1)); 
  S(j,available(1:numItemsToForget)) = 0; 
end 
  
for j=1:size(E,1) 
  available = Shuffle(find(E(j,:)==1)); 
  E(j,available(1:numItemsToForget)) = 0; 
end 
  
% ... and forget bound memories in a bound fashion: 
for j=1:size(R,1) 
  available = Shuffle(find(R(j,:)==1)); 
  R(j,available(1:numItemsToForget)) = 0; 
end 
  
% Now calculate percent correct/condProb again: 
G_S = rand(subs,items)<=0.50; 
G_E = rand(subs,items)<=0.50; 
  
stateCorrect = (~useBoundForTrial & S) | (useBoundForTrial & R) | G_S; 
exempCorrect = (~useBoundForTrial & E) | (useBoundForTrial & R) | G_E; BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     54 
 
  
% Now calculate conditional probability for long delay: 
condProb_LongDelay = mean(stateCorrect(exempCorrect==1)) ... 
  - mean(stateCorrect(exempCorrect==0)); 
  
  
 
 
Figure A1. Best fit models that vary in both the memory boundedness and the correlation 
between state and exemplar encoding. (A, B) Both the short-delay and long-delay 
conditions can be fit by assuming a correlation at encoding, a bounded memory 
representation, or any mixture of the two. (C) However, the combined data can only be fit 
by assuming that nearly all of the forgetting is independent (i.e., that the dependence 
results almost entirely from correlations at encoding). This is because observers’ 
dependence decreases much more rapidly than would be expected by a model with bound 
memory representations. The best fit parameters for explaining both the short delay and 
long-delay data suggest 97% independence between state and exemplar properties with a 
correlation of r=0.63 in the initial encoding of state and exemplar properties. 
 
Using this model we can compute predictions for each combination of 
boundedness and encoding correlation, given the percent correct we observe for short- 
and long-delay. We can then compare the condition probability predicted by those 
models to that we actually observe and compute an error term (root mean square error). 
These raw errors are plotted in Figure 1A; the minimum error values are plotted in Figure 
5 in the main text.  
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Appendix C 
 
Our model of how bound a memory representation appears is based on a high-
threshold memory model. In particular, we assume that observers successfully remember 
some proportion of the items and have no information about others. Such high-threshold 
models provide reasonable fits to recollection data (Yonelinas, 1999; Parks & Yonelinas, 
2007) and thus should be sufficient to distinguish between our bound and independent 
hypotheses, even if ultimately signal detection may be a better model of recollection 
processes (e.g., Wixted, 2007). In addition, forced-choice tasks in general are less 
sensitive to the distinction between signal detection and threshold models because, when 
there is little response bias, there is little dependence on the particular shape of the 
response operating characteristic curve that distinguishes these models (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005). Although these points mitigate concerns over using a high-threshold 
model, it is also possible to examine our data using signal detection.  
In particular, we can model a bound hypothesis as reflecting a single underlying 
memory signal. Specifically, the correct item’s memory strength would be reflected by a 
normal distribution centered at d-prime, with the three distractors each centered around 0.  
This framing of our task is in line with a signal detection model of the Deese-Roediger-
McDermott task (e.g., Wixted & Stretch, 2000; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). The 
independence hypothesis, by contrast, would be modeled as reflecting two underlying 
memory signals: a state familiarity signal, and an exemplar familiarity signal. Thus, the 
underlying memory signal must be considered in a two dimensional space, where the 
correct item’s memory signal is reflected by a normal distribution centered at (state-d-BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     56 
 
prime, exemplar-d-prime), and the distractors are centered at (state-d-prime, 0), 
(exemplar-d-prime, 0), and (0,0).  
To model performance in our task, we must convert these underlying memory 
strengths into a model of our particular 4-alternative forced-choice comparison. In the 
case of a straightforward 2AFC task with unrelated targets and foils, d-prime = sqrt(2) * 
z(pc), where z is the inverse cumulative normal distribution function (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005). This is because the distance between two orthogonal normal 
distributions, each centered at d-prime, is sqrt(2) * d-prime. To generalize to our higher-
dimensional stimuli and 4-alternative task, we can simulate the process that leads to this 
formula by using Monte Carlo methods. In particular, in the 2AFC case, we can sample a 
large number of memory strengths from a normal distribution centered at d-prime and 
from one centered at 0, and, for each pair, ask how likely the greater memory strength is 
to be from the correct item, rather than the foil. To generalize to the 4AFC case we can 
simply sample from each of the 4 items’ memory strengths and once again ask how likely 
the item with the highest memory strength is to be correct on state and/or exemplar to 
determine a percent correct. 
For the independent model, a decision must be made about how observers’ pool 
information from the two memory signals to choose a single answer. There are at least 
two possibilities: (a) they choose the item with the largest summed familiarity signal; (b) 
they choose the item whose combined memory signal is most likely to have come from 
an “old” item, e.g., according to the likelihood ratio (Irwin & Hautus, 1997). In the 
current model, this means the item most likely to have been generated by a normal 
distribution centered at (state-d-prime, exemplar-d-prime).  BINDING IN VISUAL MEMORY     57 
 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Modeled boundedness
R
e
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
 
b
o
u
n
d
e
d
n
e
s
s
 
 
pc = 0.62
pc = 0.72
pc = 0.82
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Modeled boundedness
R
e
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
 
b
o
u
n
d
e
d
n
e
s
s
 
 
pc = 0.62
pc = 0.72
pc = 0.82
 
 
Figure A2.  (A). Results if the independence model relies upon summed familiarity 
choice rule. (B) Results if independence model relies upon likelihood ratio choice rule. In 
each plot, the different lines correspond to different underlying percent correct/d-prime in 
the simulated data.  The dashed black line corresponds to equality, x=y. 
 
Finally, we can take these modeled 4AFC choices and ask, if we fit our high-
threshold model to these data, how bounded does the result look?  In particular, we can 
mix samples from the bound model and the independent model together in a certain ratio, 
simulating partially bound memory representations, and ask whether our high-threshold 
model can accurately recover the percent bounded that is simulated according to the 
signal detection model. We find that it can (Figure A2). While the recovered 
boundedness scores do systematically deviate from the modeled boundedness, they do so 
in a well-behaved, linear fashion that differs little based on the underlying percent 
correct/d-prime of the model. Thus, even if signal detection is a better model of the 
underlying memory traces and decision process, our conclusions remain unaffected: the 
dependence of state and exemplar decreases systematically over time and does so at a rate 
much greater than we would expect by the decrease in percent correct or, 
correspondingly, d-prime. 